Exodus 21

Introduction

Exodus 21 opens the section of the Torah traditionally called the Book of the Covenant (Exodus 21-23), which is the oldest collection of case law in the Bible. Having spoken the Ten Commandments directly to Israel from Mount Sinai in Exodus 20, God now gives Moses a detailed body of ordinances — מִשְׁפָּטִים — that apply the broad principles of the Decalogue to the concrete realities of daily life. Where the Ten Words are apodictic law ("You shall" / "You shall not"), the mishpatim are casuistic law ("If a man does X, then Y"), the kind of case-by-case legal reasoning found throughout the ancient Near East. This chapter moves from the regulation of servitude, to capital offenses, to personal injury, to property damage caused by animals — always with an eye toward protecting human life and dignity.

What is remarkable about these laws, when read in their ancient Near Eastern context, is not their strangeness but their surprising humanity. The Code of Hammurabi (c. 1750 BC) and other Mesopotamian legal collections address many of the same topics, but the Israelite laws consistently elevate the status of the vulnerable — servants, women, the unborn, and even slaves whose bodies are damaged by their masters. The lex talionis ("eye for eye"), far from being primitive, is a principle of proportional justice that limits vengeance and protects the weak from disproportionate retaliation. The chapter begins, strikingly, with laws that guarantee the freedom of Hebrew servants — the very first ordinance God gives a nation of freshly liberated slaves is a law against permanent enslavement.

The Ordinances Introduced (v. 1)

Notes

• מִשְׁפָּטִים ("ordinances") — This word, from the root שָׁפַט ("to judge, govern"), refers to judicial decisions, legal rulings, or case laws. It is distinct from דְּבָרִים ("words") used for the Ten Commandments and from חֻקִּים ("statutes"), though all three terms overlap in later usage. The mishpatim are the practical outworking of the principles declared in the Ten Words. The conjunction וְ ("and") at the start of the verse connects this legal collection directly to the Sinai revelation of Exodus 20 — these are not separate from the covenant but part of it.

• תָּשִׂים לִפְנֵיהֶם ("you shall set before them") — The verb שִׂים ("to set, place") with לִפְנֵי ("before the face of") implies more than merely reading the laws aloud. Moses is to lay them out clearly, explain them, and make them accessible. The rabbinical tradition (Talmud, Eruvin 54b) understood this phrase to mean Moses was to teach the laws until they were fully understood, not simply recited. The laws are given to the whole community ("them"), not just to judges or priests.

Laws Concerning Hebrew Servants (vv. 2-6)

Notes

• עֶבֶד עִבְרִי ("Hebrew servant") — The word עֶבֶד covers a range of meaning from "slave" to "servant" to "bondsman." In this context, it refers to debt servitude — a Hebrew who has sold himself (or been sold) to pay a debt, not a person captured in war or born into chattel slavery. The parallel law in Deuteronomy 15:12-18 makes this explicit: "If your brother, a Hebrew man or a Hebrew woman, is sold to you..." The six-year limit on service is revolutionary for the ancient Near East. The Code of Hammurabi (law 117) limits debt servitude to three years but applies only to family members given as surety, not to the debtor himself.

• לַחָפְשִׁי חִנָּם ("free, for nothing") — Two words emphasize the completeness of the release. חָפְשִׁי means "free, released from obligation," and חִנָּם means "without cost, gratis." The servant owes nothing upon release — no buyout, no residual debt. Deuteronomy 15:13-14 goes further, requiring the master to send the servant away with generous provisions from flock, threshing floor, and winepress.

• בְּגַפּוֹ ("by himself") — This unusual word appears only here in the Hebrew Bible. It literally means "with his body" or "in his singleness," from a root meaning "body" or "wing." The KJV renders it "by himself," the ESV "single." It denotes a man who comes into service without a wife — alone, with only his own body. The repetition — "if with his body he comes in, with his body he shall go out" — creates a legal principle of symmetry: whatever condition a person enters service in, that is the condition in which he leaves.

• אָמֹר יֹאמַר ("plainly says") — Another infinitive absolute construction for emphasis, literally "saying, he says." The declaration must be voluntary and emphatic. The servant is not coerced; he speaks out of love. The motivation given is striking: "I love my master, my wife, and my children." The word אָהַבְתִּי ("I love") is the same verb used for covenant love throughout Scripture. This is a free choice made out of affection and loyalty, not compulsion.

• אֶל הָאֱלֹהִים ("before God") — The BSB translates this as "before the judges," and the BSB footnote notes the alternative "before God." The Hebrew אֱלֹהִים can mean "God," "gods," or "judges" (as God's representatives). The KJV and ESV both render it "to God," and many interpreters understand this as a formal appearance at a local sanctuary or before divinely appointed authorities. I have translated it "before God" to preserve the ambiguity and theological weight of the original. The ceremony is not merely bureaucratic — it takes place in the presence of the divine.

• וְרָצַע אֲדֹנָיו אֶת אָזְנוֹ בַּמַּרְצֵעַ ("his master shall pierce his ear with an awl") — The ear-piercing ceremony is performed at the door or doorpost (הַדֶּלֶת or הַמְּזוּזָה), marking the servant's permanent attachment to the household. The ear may be chosen because it symbolizes hearing and obedience — the servant has "heard" the call of love and chosen to remain. Psalm 40:6 echoes this image: "Sacrifice and offering you did not desire, but my ears you have opened" (literally "ears you have dug for me"), and the author of Hebrews applies this to Christ's willing submission to the Father's will (Hebrews 10:5-7).

• לְעֹלָם ("permanently") — Often translated "forever," this word can mean "for a very long time" or "for the duration of an age." In this legal context, most interpreters understand it to mean "for the rest of his life" or until the Year of Jubilee (Leviticus 25:39-41), when all Hebrew servants were to be released regardless. The Jubilee provision suggests that even "permanent" service had a limit in God's economy.

Interpretations

The relationship between the servant laws of Exodus 21 and the Jubilee laws of Leviticus 25:39-46 has been debated. Some interpreters argue that "forever" in v. 6 is qualified by the Jubilee — the ear-pierced servant goes free in the fiftieth year regardless. Others hold that the voluntary commitment of Exodus 21 overrides the Jubilee release, since the servant has freely chosen permanent attachment. The New Testament writers saw in this passage a typological picture of Christ, who willingly took on the form of a servant out of love (Philippians 2:7) and whose body was pierced in voluntary self-offering. The early church father Origen and many Reformed commentators developed this christological reading, seeing the "ear opened" of Psalm 40:6 as the bridge between the Exodus servant and the suffering Messiah.

Protections for Female Servants (vv. 7-11)

Notes

• לְאָמָה ("as a maidservant") — The word אָמָה refers specifically to a female servant, distinct from שִׁפְחָה, which often denotes a lower-status servant or concubine. In this context, the sale of a daughter as an amah is essentially a betrothal arrangement — the father, unable to provide a dowry, sells his daughter into a household with the expectation that she will become the wife or concubine of the master or his son. This is not trafficking; it is a provision for impoverished families to secure their daughters' futures in a society where an unmarried, unprotected woman was desperately vulnerable.

• לֹא תֵצֵא כְּצֵאת הָעֲבָדִים ("she shall not go out as the male servants go out") — She does not simply go free after six years as male servants do, because her arrangement is not mere labor but a marital commitment. However, the laws that follow are entirely protective of her — every provision works in her favor, not the master's.

• יְעָדָהּ ("designated her") — From the root יָעַד ("to appoint, designate"), this indicates the master had marked her out for himself as a wife or concubine. There is a textual note (Qere/Ketiv) here: the written text (Ketiv) reads לֹא ("not"), suggesting "who has not designated her," while the read text (Qere) reads לוֹ ("for himself"). The difference affects meaning: did the master designate her for himself and then change his mind, or did he fail to designate her at all? Both readings lead to the same legal outcome — she must be redeemed.

• וְהֶפְדָּהּ ("he must let her be redeemed") — The root פָּדָה ("to redeem, ransom") means to buy back. If the master is dissatisfied, he cannot simply discard her; he must allow her family to buy her back. The verb is Hiphil, indicating he must facilitate the redemption. And the next clause is emphatic: he has absolutely no right (לֹא יִמְשֹׁל, "he shall not have authority") to sell her to foreigners.

• בְּבִגְדוֹ בָהּ ("since he has dealt treacherously with her") — The root בָּגַד means "to act treacherously, deal faithlessly." This is the same word used for marital unfaithfulness in Malachi 2:14-16. The law treats the master's rejection of the woman as a breach of covenant — he made a commitment, and breaking it is treachery, not a neutral business decision.

• שְׁאֵרָהּ כְּסוּתָהּ וְעֹנָתָהּ ("her food, her clothing, and her conjugal rights") — These three provisions form a minimum standard of care. שְׁאֵר literally means "flesh" or "food/sustenance," כְּסוּת means "clothing/covering," and עֹנָה refers to her conjugal or marital rights. The inclusion of marital intimacy as a legal right of the wife is remarkable — she is not merely to be fed and clothed but fully treated as a wife. If any of these three are withheld, she goes free — חִנָּם אֵין כָּסֶף ("for nothing, without money"). She owes nothing and takes her freedom with her.

Capital Offenses (vv. 12-17)

Notes

• מַכֵּה אִישׁ וָמֵת ("whoever strikes a man so that he dies") — The participial construction מַכֵּה (Hiphil participle of נָכָה, "to strike") describes the act generically: anyone who strikes fatally. The phrase מוֹת יוּמָת ("shall surely be put to death") uses the infinitive absolute for legal emphasis — the death penalty is certain and mandatory. This law applies the sixth commandment (Exodus 20:13) to practical jurisprudence.

• לֹא צָדָה ("he did not lie in wait") — The verb צָדָה means "to lie in wait, to hunt, to lurk with intent." Its negation establishes the critical distinction between murder and manslaughter — the absence of premeditation. The phrase וְהָאֱלֹהִים אִנָּה לְיָדוֹ ("and God let it happen to his hand") is theologically striking: accidental death is attributed to divine providence. The verb אִנָּה (from אָנָה, "to cause to meet, to bring about") suggests that God orchestrated the circumstances. This does not excuse the killer from all consequence — he must flee to a designated place of refuge — but it distinguishes his culpability from that of a murderer. The cities of refuge are later formalized in Numbers 35:9-34 and Deuteronomy 19:1-13.

• וְכִי יָזִד אִישׁ עַל רֵעֵהוּ לְהָרְגוֹ בְעָרְמָה ("if a man acts presumptuously against his neighbor to kill him by cunning") — The verb זִיד means "to act presumptuously, to boil over with arrogance." Combined with עָרְמָה ("cunning, craftiness"), it describes calculated, deliberate murder. For such a person, even the altar of God provides no sanctuary — מֵעִם מִזְבְּחִי תִּקָּחֶנּוּ ("from my altar you shall take him"). In the ancient Near East, altars and temples were places of asylum. God's law overrides this custom for premeditated murder: no sacred space can shield a willful killer. This principle is illustrated in 1 Kings 2:28-34, where Joab clings to the altar but is executed by Solomon's order.

• וּמַכֵּה אָבִיו וְאִמּוֹ ("whoever strikes his father or his mother") — Striking a parent is treated as a capital offense, applying the fifth commandment (Exodus 20:12) with utmost severity. The same punishment applies to וּמְקַלֵּל ("whoever curses") a parent in v. 17. The verb קָלַל means "to make light of, to treat with contempt, to curse." It is the opposite of כָּבֵד ("to honor, make heavy"), the verb used in the fifth commandment. Jesus cited this law in his confrontation with the Pharisees over Corban traditions (Matthew 15:4, Mark 7:10).

• וְגֹנֵב אִישׁ וּמְכָרוֹ ("whoever steals a man and sells him") — This law criminalizes kidnapping for the purpose of enslavement. The verb גָּנַב ("to steal") is the same verb used in the eighth commandment (Exodus 20:15). Many interpreters have noted that this law, placed among capital offenses, shows how seriously Israel's God regarded the enslavement of free persons. The penalty applies whether the kidnapper has already sold the victim or still has possession of him. Paul references this law in 1 Timothy 1:10, listing "enslavers" (or "man-stealers") among the lawless.

Laws Concerning Personal Injury (vv. 18-19)

Notes

• יְרִיבֻן אֲנָשִׁים ("men quarrel") — The verb רִיב means "to contend, quarrel, strive." This envisions a fight that escalates beyond words to blows. The law distinguishes this from premeditated violence (v. 14) — this is a brawl, not an assassination.

• בְּאֶבֶן אוֹ בְאֶגְרֹף ("with a stone or with a fist") — The Hebrew specifies the weapons: אֶבֶן ("stone") or אֶגְרֹף ("fist"). These are improvised or natural weapons, not swords or spears, reinforcing the picture of a quarrel that turns violent rather than a planned attack.

• וְנָפַל לְמִשְׁכָּב ("takes to his bed") — Literally "falls to a lying down." The injured party is bedridden — seriously hurt but not fatally.

• וְנִקָּה הַמַּכֶּה ("the one who struck shall be acquitted") — The Niphal of נָקָה ("to be clean, innocent, acquitted") means the striker is cleared of capital liability, but not of all responsibility. The two obligations — שִׁבְתּוֹ יִתֵּן ("he shall give his lost time," i.e., compensate for lost wages) and וְרַפֹּא יְרַפֵּא ("he shall surely cause him to be healed," i.e., pay medical expenses) — represent a remarkably modern principle of tort law: the offender pays both for lost income and for medical treatment. The infinitive absolute רַפֹּא יְרַפֵּא emphasizes thorough, complete healing.

Injury to Servants (vv. 20-21)

Notes

• נָקֹם יִנָּקֵם ("he shall surely be avenged") — The Niphal infinitive absolute construction of נָקַם ("to avenge") is emphatic: vengeance shall certainly fall. The precise nature of the punishment is debated — the Talmud (Sanhedrin 52b) generally understood it as the death penalty, since the context of vv. 12-17 is capital punishment. This is extraordinary in the ancient Near East: a master who beats his servant to death is subject to legal punishment. In Mesopotamian law, killing another person's slave was typically a property crime requiring compensation to the owner — not a crime against the slave's person. Here, the servant's life has intrinsic value.

• כִּי כַסְפּוֹ הוּא ("for he is his money") — This clause in v. 21 has troubled readers throughout history. If the servant survives a day or two after the beating, the master is not punished, because the servant is his "money" (i.e., his property, his financial investment). The reasoning seems to be that a master who beats his own servant non-fatally is punishing himself financially — a severely injured servant cannot work, so the master suffers the economic loss. The law assumes that survival indicates the intent was discipline, not murder. Nevertheless, vv. 26-27 add a further protection: if the beating causes permanent injury (loss of an eye or tooth), the servant goes free entirely.

Interpretations

The tension between v. 20 (the master is punished for killing a servant) and v. 21 (the master is not punished if the servant survives) has generated extensive discussion. Some interpreters argue that the one-or-two-day survival window establishes that death was not the intended result, making it analogous to the manslaughter provision in v. 13. Others emphasize that even the limited protections here were radical for the ancient world — no other ancient Near Eastern law code punished a master for killing his own slave. Abolitionists and modern ethicists have rightly noted that these laws, while progressive for their time, still operate within a framework of servitude that the full arc of biblical revelation ultimately undermines. The trajectory from Exodus 21 through Philemon 1:15-16 and Galatians 3:28 moves toward the abolition of the master-slave distinction altogether.

Injury to a Pregnant Woman and the Lex Talionis (vv. 22-25)

Notes

• וְכִי יִנָּצוּ אֲנָשִׁים ("when men are struggling") — The verb נָצָה (Niphal, "to struggle, strive") suggests a violent altercation — this is not a minor scuffle but a serious physical conflict. In the course of this fight, a pregnant woman (אִשָּׁה הָרָה) is struck.

• וְיָצְאוּ יְלָדֶיהָ ("and her children come out") — This phrase is the crux of a major interpretive debate. The verb יָצָא ("to go out, come out") is used elsewhere for live birth (e.g., Genesis 25:25-26), and יְלָדִים ("children") is the normal word for living offspring, not for a miscarried fetus. Many interpreters therefore understand this as a premature live birth: the woman gives birth early due to the blow, but the child survives. If there is "no harm" (אָסוֹן), a fine suffices. If there is אָסוֹן ("serious harm" — to mother or child), the lex talionis applies.

• אָסוֹן ("serious harm" or "catastrophe") — This rare word appears only here and in the Joseph narrative (Genesis 42:4, Genesis 42:38, Genesis 44:29), where Jacob fears that "harm" will befall Benjamin. Its precise meaning is debated, but it clearly refers to a grave or fatal injury. The critical question is whether the אָסוֹן refers to harm to the mother, to the child, or to either. The grammar permits all three readings.

• וְנָתַתָּה נֶפֶשׁ תַּחַת נָפֶשׁ ("you shall give life for life") — The preposition תַּחַת ("in place of, instead of") establishes the principle of equivalence. The lex talionis ("law of retaliation") that follows in vv. 24-25 — eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe — is not a command to inflict mutilation but a principle of proportional justice. The punishment must fit the crime: no more, no less. In a world where blood feuds could escalate endlessly, this law sets a ceiling on retribution. The Talmud (Bava Kamma 83b-84a) interpreted the lex talionis as requiring monetary compensation equivalent to the injury, not literal physical retaliation, and this became standard Jewish legal practice.

• Jesus cites the lex talionis in Matthew 5:38-39: "You have heard that it was said, 'An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.' But I say to you, do not resist the one who is evil." Jesus does not invalidate the principle of proportional justice in the legal sphere but calls his followers to a higher ethic of non-retaliation in personal relationships. The original law was about courts and justice; Jesus' teaching is about the posture of the heart.

Interpretations

The interpretation of vv. 22-23 has significant implications for the theology of the unborn. (1) The premature birth interpretation (held by many evangelical and Reformed scholars) reads וְיָצְאוּ יְלָדֶיהָ as a premature live birth. On this reading, both mother and child are fully protected by the lex talionis if serious harm occurs — the unborn child has the same legal standing as any other person. (2) The miscarriage interpretation (found in the Septuagint rendering and followed by some patristic writers and modern scholars) reads the phrase as a miscarriage. On this reading, the loss of the fetus results only in a fine (v. 22), while serious harm to the mother triggers the lex talionis — suggesting a distinction in legal status between the unborn and the born. The Septuagint introduced a further distinction between a "formed" and "unformed" fetus, which influenced early Christian discussions of ensoulment. (3) The both-are-protected interpretation holds that אָסוֹן applies to harm to either mother or child, making the passage a strong affirmation of fetal personhood. The Hebrew grammar most naturally supports reading (1) or (3), since יְלָדִים typically refers to living children and יָצָא typically describes live emergence.

Permanent Injury to Servants (vv. 26-27)

Notes

• וְשִׁחֲתָהּ ("and destroys it") — The verb שָׁחַת means "to destroy, ruin, corrupt." The eye is not merely injured but destroyed — permanent, irreversible damage.

• לַחָפְשִׁי יְשַׁלְּחֶנּוּ תַּחַת עֵינוֹ ("he shall let him go free on account of his eye") — The same חָפְשִׁי ("free") from v. 2 reappears. The servant's freedom is the compensation (תַּחַת, "in place of") for the lost eye or tooth. This provision is stunning: the eye and tooth are mentioned as representative examples (the least and the most visible injuries), establishing that any permanent bodily harm inflicted by a master results in the servant's complete liberation. No ancient Near Eastern law code comes close to this protection. In Hammurabi's code, injuring someone else's slave required only financial compensation to the slave's owner — the slave's own body and freedom were never the concern.

• These verses also serve as a practical application of the lex talionis to the master-servant relationship. Since one cannot take the master's eye for the servant's eye (the social disparity would make this impractical in the ancient world), the equivalent is the most valuable thing the master possesses with respect to the servant: the servant's service itself. Freedom is the restitution.

The Goring Ox (vv. 28-32)

Notes

• וְכִי יִגַּח שׁוֹר ("when an ox gores") — The verb נָגַח means "to gore, to thrust with horns." The ox (or bull) was the most powerful domesticated animal in the ancient Near East, and a goring ox was a well-known legal problem — Hammurabi's laws (250-252) address it as well. The Israelite law is more protective of human life than its Mesopotamian parallels.

• סָקוֹל יִסָּקֵל הַשּׁוֹר ("the ox shall surely be stoned") — The animal is executed, and its flesh לֹא יֵאָכֵל ("shall not be eaten"). The stoning of the animal and the prohibition on eating its flesh are not merely practical — they reflect the theological principle that blood guilt contaminates. An animal that has taken human life is treated as bearing a kind of guilt (cf. Genesis 9:5, where God requires the blood of a human life even from animals). The owner, however, is נָקִי ("innocent, clean") if this was the first incident.

• שׁוֹר נַגָּח הוּא מִתְּמֹל שִׁלְשֹׁם ("the ox was a gorer from yesterday and the day before") — The phrase מִתְּמוֹל שִׁלְשֹׁם ("from yesterday and the third day") is an idiom meaning "in the past, previously, with a known history." If the ox had a documented pattern of goring and the owner was formally warned (וְהוּעַד בִּבְעָלָיו, "and testimony was given to its owner") but failed to restrain it, the owner becomes liable for the death. This is the legal principle of known risk and negligent failure to act — strikingly similar to modern doctrines of negligence and foreseeability.

• כֹּפֶר ("ransom") — The word comes from the root כָּפַר ("to cover, atone, ransom") and refers to a redemption payment. Although the owner's life is technically forfeit (v. 29), the community may impose a monetary ransom instead (v. 30). The owner וְנָתַן פִּדְיֹן נַפְשׁוֹ ("shall give the redemption price for his life"). Both כֹּפֶר and פִּדְיוֹן ("redemption") are central terms in the theology of atonement. Notably, Numbers 35:31 explicitly prohibits accepting ransom for a deliberate murderer — but for negligent homicide through an animal, ransom is permitted.

• כֶּסֶף שְׁלֹשִׁים שְׁקָלִים ("thirty shekels of silver") — When the victim is a servant, the fixed compensation is thirty shekels of silver, paid to the servant's master. This amount appears to be the standard valuation of a servant in the ancient Near East (cf. the price of Joseph's sale in some reckonings). The number gained profound significance when Zechariah prophesied that the shepherd of Israel would be valued at thirty pieces of silver — "the handsome price at which they valued me!" (Zechariah 11:12-13). Matthew explicitly connects Judas's betrayal price of thirty silver coins to this prophecy (Matthew 26:15, Matthew 27:3-10).

The Open Pit and Ox-on-Ox Damage (vv. 33-36)

Notes

• וְכִי יִפְתַּח אִישׁ בּוֹר ("when a man opens a pit") — The verb פָּתַח ("to open") refers to uncovering an existing cistern or pit, while כָּרָה ("to dig") refers to creating a new one. Both actions create a hazard. The law covers both the person who uncovers an existing danger and the person who creates a new one. The principle is straightforward: whoever creates a hazard is responsible for the damage it causes. The בּוֹר ("pit, cistern") was a common feature of the landscape — water storage cisterns were everywhere, and an uncovered pit was a genuine threat to livestock and people alike.

• בַּעַל הַבּוֹר יְשַׁלֵּם ("the owner of the pit shall make restitution") — The word בַּעַל ("owner, master, lord") here means simply "the responsible party." He must pay the value of the lost animal to its owner, but he keeps the carcass (וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לּוֹ, "and the dead animal shall be his"). This prevents double loss and double gain: the animal owner receives fair compensation, and the pit owner gets whatever value remains in the carcass (meat, hide).

• וּמָכְרוּ אֶת הַשּׁוֹר הַחַי וְחָצוּ אֶת כַּסְפּוֹ ("they shall sell the living ox and divide the price") — When one man's ox kills another's and neither owner was negligent, the loss is shared equally: the living ox is sold and the proceeds split, and the dead ox is likewise divided. This is an equitable solution — both parties absorb part of the loss. However, if the goring ox had a known history (v. 36), the negligent owner bears the full cost: שַׁלֵּם יְשַׁלֵּם שׁוֹר תַּחַת הַשּׁוֹר ("he shall surely pay ox for ox"). The infinitive absolute again signals emphasis and certainty.

• The progression throughout the ox laws (vv. 28-36) reveals a consistent legal principle: liability increases with knowledge and negligence. A first-time incident carries minimal liability for the owner. A repeated pattern that was known and ignored carries maximum liability. This principle — that foreknowledge of danger increases responsibility — is foundational to both biblical and modern jurisprudence.